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Book Reviews

THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND
NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH ABOUT "HIGH
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS" AND THE
CONSTITUTION'S IMPEACHMENT
PROCESS
HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: THE CASE
AGAINST BILL CLINTON. By Ann Coultee Regnery
Publishing, Inc. 1998. Pp. 358. $24.95.
Vikram David Amal

On the first page of her bestselling book, High Crimes and
Misdemeanors, Ann Coulter observes that political punditry and
careful legal analysis are very different things. (p. 1) This insight-the truth of which has been driven home, painfully at
times, to anyone with cable over the last few years-may seem
unremarkable. But it does pose great difficulties for someone
like me, steeped as I am in the legal academy, in reviewing her
book. For High Crimes and Misdemeanors does not purport to
be a thorough, analytic, balanced and rigorous treatment of the
impeachment process, either in general or as applied to President Clinton. And it would be unfair for me to hold it to the
standards of good academic scholarship.
On the other hand, good academic scholars should care
about the things Ms. Coulter asserts in her book, for a few reasons. To begin with, the book sets out an interesting, though by
no means uncontested, synthesis of the events surrounding variI. Attorney and Legal Affairs Correspondent for Human Events.
2. Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings; Visiting Professor of Law,
University of California at Berkeley. A.B. 1985 University of California at Berkeley;
J.D. 1988 Yale Law School.
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ous of President Clinton's legal/political problems. The facts she
alleges and the evidence she adduces concerning matters outside
the Starr Report-such as Whitewater, Filegate and the Travel
Office episode-should perhaps be taken with a healthy dose of
salt, especially given that Judge Starr and his office apparently
have disagreed with Ms. Coulter as to the weight of the actual
proof of wrongdoing. But Ms. Coulter's depiction of these affairs
is interesting reading nonetheless, and helps paint a picture of
President Clinton's personality that may help to explain-better
than any legal niceties ever could-why so many persons, both
within and without Congress, simply cannot abide Mr. Clinton.
The book's factual account of the Monica Lewinsky matter
is better grounded, by references to grand jury and civil deposition testimony and other supporting documentation, and provides a good starting point for any discussion-on the Hill or in
the ivory tower-about the impeachability of Mr. Clinton. For
that reason alone, people really interested in factually unraveling
the mess that has preoccupied Washington will find the book
worth skimming. But perhaps more important than any of this,
the more general arguments the book makes, about the nature
of the impeachment process and its alternatives, both reflect and
in tum help shape the perceptions held by the reading public and
those in Congress. And because nearly everyone agrees that
there is no (or virtually no) judicial review of the Presidential
impeachment process, the impressions of Congresspersons and
the public are the impressions that count. One could argue that
in the long run the Constitution always means what the People
who continue to make it the Supreme Law of the Land believe it
to mean. Whether that statement is descriptively true about the
entire Constitution or not, it is certainly true about the impeachment provisions, which are self-consciously styled as a hybrid of law and politics. Thus, what Ms. Coulter is saying in this
book is constitutionally important merely because she has been
saying it to so many and such impressionable people.
What she says about the facts of !he Monica Lewinsky episode is, as I just suggested, within ttc mainstream of both Republican and larger American opinion. At bottom, she demonstrates that President Clinton had an extremely unseemly,
inappropriate and unwise physical (I'll avoid the contested term
"sexual" here) affair, and that he lied in order to cover it up,
sometimes while he was under oath, and at other times looking
the American people in the eye. I think Ms. Coulter is basically
right about these facts. But when Ms. Coulter goes on to discuss
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the constitutional backdrop against which these facts ought to be
considered, her arguments are much weaker-even when judged
by standards less Figorous than those employed in law reviews.
Ironically, many of the failings of Ms. Coulter's description and
analysis of the Constitution resemble in form the failings of Mr.
Clinton's factual statements concerning the Lewinsky affair.
That is, like the President she detests (and she makes no bones
about detesting him), Ms. Coulter is often guilty of telling halftruths-statements that may be in some sense technically true
but which are terribly misleading3 -about the Constitution. In
the balance of this short review, I shall explain and try to set the
record straight as to some of the most important of these constitutional half-truths.
HALF-TRUTH #1: IMPEACHABLE CONDUCT NEED
NOT BE CRIMINAL, AND MAY BE "PRIVATE" IN
NATURE
Ms. Coulter quite correctly debunks the myth that the
phrase "bribery, treason and other high crimes and misdemeanors" refers only to matters that would be considered criminally
indictable in a federal or state court. Quick reference to history
and common sense confirms this result. The impeachment of
federal judges in the early 19th century for inability to perform
job duties on account of senility or habitual drunkenness, as well
as the extensive discussions on the relevance of the criminal law
to impeachment undertaken in the Andrew Johnson impeachment proceedings, strongly refute the idea that conduct need
violate some criminal statute in order to support impeachment
and conviction. Instead, non-criminal conduct which renders a
national official incapable or unwilling to faithfully discharge his
public trust will support removal. And this has to be the case.
Imagine a President who simply ran off on vacation for months
at a time, even (or especially) during times of national crisis,
4
phoning in once a week for messages. Even though such irresponsible conduct runs afoul of no criminal statute, could a sen-

3. By this I do not mean to suggest that the President is guilty only of half-truths.
Some of his statements, including some statements under oath, such as his statements
that he couldn't recall being alone with Ms. Lewinsky, or that he couldn't recall any specific gifts she gave him or any specific conversations he had with her, can only be fairly
characterized as outright lies.
4. A variant on this hypothetical, as well as other convincing hypotheticals, can be
found in Charles Black, Impeachment: A Handbook 33-49 (Yale U. Press, 1974).
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sible Constitution (and ours is nothing if not sensible) bind the
country to four years of such (non)rule?
Ms. Coulter is also technically accurate when asserting that
"private" misconduct can justify Presidential impeachment.
Suppose a President committed murder or rape for purely private reasons. The fact that such misdeeds were committed by the
President not in his capacity as President but rather in capacity
as individual, and the fact that the victim was not the public fisc,
surely does not mean the country is stuck with a murderer or
rapist as President for his entire elected term. 5 Indeed, because
1-along with people from Laurence Tribe to Robert Bork-believe that a sitting President is not criminally prosecutable while
in office,6 my view is that impeachment for the commission of
abhorrent crimes like murder, which render the President absolutely unable to credibly lead, is the only way to remove.7
5. Here I part company with the House Judiciary Committee Report in the Andrew Johnson impeachment affair, which concluded that "private" misconduct, even
murder, might not be the basis for impeachment. See Michael Les Benedict, The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson 74-80 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1973). I also part
company with some of the statements made by esteemed constitutional law scholars,
such as Cass Sunstein, before the House Judiciary Committee investigating President
Ointon, to the same effect.
6. The simplest way to see that federalism and separation of powers precludes
prosecution of a sitting President is to ask, "who would be empowered to prosecute
him?" A state prosecutor and grand jury, which represents only a smaU locality and its
parochial disagreements with a President? (Imagine a South Carolina grand jury and district attorney having the power to indict and prosecute newly-elected President Abraham
Lincoln in 1861). A United States Attorney, who is "inferior" and accountable to, as well
as removable by, the President himself? Or an "independent" counsel, who answers to
no one? Even assuming the Independent Counsel Act is constitutional as applied to the
President (a question not addressed in Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)), actual
prosecution of a sitting President raises even more constitutional problems than investigations and reports. To put the point another way, there is a big difference between a
referral to Congress (which then has the power to act and the accountability to the entire
People of the country when it does act) and a criminal prosecution itself. For a discussion of this issue, as well as other issues such as the practical question whether a convicted President could preside from prison, see Akhil Reed Amar and Brian C. Kalt, The
Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 Nexus J. Op. 11 (1997).
Nor is the question of presidential susceptibility to prosecution resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in the Paula Jones civil case. It goes without saying that criminal
prosecution of the President threatens the ability of the executive branch to function
much more than does the specter of civil litigation and liability. Moreover, Paula Jones
had but one redress for her alleged injuries-civillitigation. Impeachment simply would
not have solved Ms. Jones' problem. By contrast, where criminal misdeeds are alleged,
the public-in whose name any criminal action would be brought-can vindicate its interests through the impeachment process.
7. As an aside, let me set the record straight on a non-truth Ms. Coulter asserts
about the impeachability of Congresspersons. Notwithstanding her suggestions, (p. 265)
House members and Senators are not "officers" within the meaning of the impeachment
clauses of the Constitution and are thus not impeachable. Each member of the House
and Senate can be expelled by two-thirds of his chamber. See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 5, cl.
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So much for the "truth" part of the half-truth. It is where
Ms. Coulter goes with these technically accurate points that I am
disinclined to follow. Based on the constitutional principles discussed thus far, Ms. Coulter concludes that President Clinton's
conduct easily qualifies as impeachable. If the only applicable
constitutional principles were the ones she describes, I might
agree with her. But they are not, and I do not. Let me be clear.
I am not saying that the President's alleged misconduct relating
to the Paula Jones and Monica Lewinsky matter did not ultimately satisfy the constitutional threshold of impeachability. I
am saying that if it did, it did so barely, not easily.
The disagreement I have with Ms. Coulter here is not simply one of applying law (the Constitution) to alleged facts. Instead, I fault Ms. Coulter- and characterize her argument as
misleadingly incomplete-for not laying out all of the law (the
Constitution) itself. Remarkably, Ms. Coulter never carefully
parses the provision in the Constitution that is most closely on
point-Article ll's statement that the President (and other civil
officers) can be impeached, convicted and removed for "bribery,
treason and other high crimes and misdemeanors." Ms. Coulter
simply never analyzes, as a good lawyer must, what the text says.
To begin with, notice that the Constitution here refers to
"high" crimes and misdemeanors, not just ordinary crimeswhich are referred to elsewhere in the Constitution. What does
"high" mean in this setting? Again, the text of the Constitution
is instructive in its specification of "other" high crimes and misdemeanors- namely, bribery and treason. That the Constitution
lists these two grave offenses as its only examples of "high" misconduct suggests that "high" really does mean serious indeed.
So whether or not conduct has to be similar in kind to bribery
and treason to be impeachable, it-as a matter of constitutional
text-has to be similar in height, or gravity. Thus, although noncriminal and private misconduct can render a President impeachable, it must be high non-criminal and private misconduct.
For this reason, Ms. Coulter's repeated assertion that the President's illicit and inappropriate affair with Ms. Lewinsky by itself
would support (indeed would require) impeachment-even
without any consideration of perjury or obstruction of justiceborders on the absurd. 8 A consensual yet stupid affair with a
2. See generally, Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional? 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 115-16 (1995).
8. She makes this assertion a number of times. (pp. 9, 258, 312)
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somewhat unstable underling simply cannot be characterized as
high misconduct of a gravity akin to bribery or treason.
Whether Mr. Clinton's public deceits and lies can be
thought of in terms as serious as bribery and treason poses a
more difficult question. But here, too, Ms. Coulter's analysis is
clipped and doesn't present enough of the whole constitutional
backdrop to enable a reader to evaluate her conclusions. Apart
from the textual inferences described above, that backdrop consists of a structure and history of the Constitution (and of the
state constitutions enacted between 1776 and 1787), all of which
suggest that quintessential impeachable misdeeds are those
which seriously corrupt or subvert the process of government itself and the country's faith in the fundamental integrity of its
leadership. Bribery and treason have this corrosive effect. So
would murder, by demonstrating utter contempt for the most
deeply-held American values and beliefs. The ultimate question-both as a legal and as a political matter-is whether the
offense is the kind of high misconduct that unfits a man to serve
in the White House even though he was duly elected. How does
Mr. Clinton fare under this standard? As I explain in a little further detail below, I think the answer depends on a number of
things. My own view is that the obstruction of justice allegations
were more serious in nature than the perjury allegations,9 but
that proof of obstruction has always been weaker than proof of
lying. For now, let me just say that I find it hard to understand
how Ms. Coulter cannot agonize over her view at all.
One other point bears mention in this context. To say that
conduct need not be criminal to be impeachable does not mean
that the criminal realm is irrelevant to impeachability. Consistent with her general tendency, Ms. Coulter recognizes part of,
but not all of, the relevance of the criminal law. She correctly
observes that serious crimes (like murder) will often (she says
almost always) evince sufficient immorality to constitute "high
crimes and misdemeanors." (p. 6) But she fails to mention to
her readers that when certain criminal conduct is unlikely to be
9. I think obstruction-if it takes the form alleged in the Ointon episode-is a
more serious corruption of government than is lying under oath. One reason is that corrupting others, such as Monica Lewinsky or Sidney Blumenthal, is more akin to bribery
than is simple perjury, because obstruction on these facts involves more than one person.
There is a legal as well as philosophical underpinning to this intuition. Legally, involving
others in one's criminality has always been an aggravating circumstance. It is for this reason that the law punishes conspiracy independently from the underlying criminal acts
agreed to. Philosophically, using other people for one's own corrupt ends seems to violate Kantian notions of respect and autonomy.
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prosecuted criminally by federal and state prosecutors because it
doesn't seem unusual and/or serious enough to warrant court
and jail time, that fact also bears on the "height" of the misdeeds. If the vast majority of state and federal prosecutors
would not find the alleged misconduct of Mr. Clinton, even if
proven, to be serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution,
that should count as a relevant (though not always dispositive)
consideration that Ms. Coulter fails to ever adequately address.
HALF-TRUTH #2: PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PERJURY
WAS IMPEACHABLE, BECAUSE PERJURY HAS
HISTORICALLY BEEN CONSIDERED A SERIOUS
CRIME AND BECAUSE FEDERAL JUDGES HAVE BEEN
IMPEACHED, CONVICTED AND REMOVED BECAUSE
OF PERJURY
This line of argument, which runs through Ms. Coulter's
discussion, (p. 280) is less than fully accurate in a number of respects. For starters, it ignores the differences between the President and federal judges. Unlike judges, the President himself
represents an entire branch of the Federal government; he and
he alone sits atop and controls the entire executive branch. Unlike Article III, which vests federal judicial power in the Supreme and lower federal courts (which consist of hundreds of individuals), the Constitution-in Article 11-vests the entirety of
the executive power in a single person- the President. A related
difference between federal judges (as well as the Vice President
and cabinet members, for that matter) on the one hand, and the
President on the other, is that the President alone enjoys a personal electoral mandate from the millions of citizens who voted
for him. Undoing that mandate is a bigger deal for a democratic
republic than is removing an unelected judge. 10 Also, since federal judges serve for life, impeachment and conviction is the only
way to prevent years, perhaps decades, of continued officeholding. A President can, of course, always be removed electorally at
the next election. 11 Finally, of relevance to the Clinton matter,
10. Some have argued that the Constitution's admonition that federal judges hold
their offices during "good behaviour," see U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1, also distinguishes
them from the President. As I read the history, however, the term "good behavior" was
intended to mean "for life." See generally, Note, Bribery and Other Not So "Good Behavior:" Criminal Prosecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1617 (1994). For this reason, I am hesitant to conclude that the "good
behaviour" clause means that federal judges can be impeached and removed for something less than "high crimes and misdemeanors."
II. If the President is serving his second full term, removal at the conclusion of that
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judges are more closely associated in the public's mind with the
integrity of judicial processes than are executive branch officials.
For all these reasons, the same clause of the Constitution- Article I's "bribery, treason and other high crimes and misdemeanors" -can have a different meanin~ when applied to the President as opposed to federal judges.' And yet Ms. Coulter does
not consider, let alone address, any of these things.
Even if one were to reject all of this, and conclude as a matter of impeachment (common) law that because perjury has
been a basis for impeaching federal judges, it must also satisfy
the high crimes and misdemeanors threshold as to the President,
Ms. Coulter's analysis would still be so incomplete as to be misleading. Crucially, she writes (and many others talk) as if all
conduct that constitutes "high crimes and misdemeanors" MUST
be pursued by the House and the Senate. She speaks in terms of
the public's and Congress' "obligation" to impeach, and "duty"
to remove. (pp. 18-19) She never identifies the source of these
obligations and duties-and for good reason; the Constitution
simply does not embody them. Once again, the text of Article I
(which Ms. Coulter never really analyzes) is instructive: "the
House ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment" 13 and
"[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments."14 Thus, the Constitution speaks only of power, not of
duty. Other Congressional powers conferred in the Constitution-such as the power to regulate interstate commerce, to borrow money, to create lower federal courts-are all understood to
be discretionary; there is no textual or historical reason to think
that the impeachment power alone does not include the discre-

term is automatic under the Twenty-Second Amendment.
Obviously, there are differences between a President and federal judges that in some
circumstances may make a President more worthy of impeachment. For example, a senile President with his finger on the button poses a more serious threat than any federal
judge. And the fact that the President owes his job to the People makes his lies to the
American public, whether under oath or not, more serious than similar lies by a federal
judge. The big point here is not that Presidential impeachment standards are necessarily
higher than those for federal judges; instead, the point is merely that the two settings involve different considerations, such that judicial impeachment precedent should have
been of limited relevance in the Ointon episode.
12. My brother has invoked an analogy to the Senate's advice and consent function
here. There is only one "advice and consent" clause, U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, but that
clause means something very different, constitutionally speaking, when it is applied to
Cabinet members than when it is applied to Supreme Court Justices. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Trial and Tribulation, New Republic 17 (Jan. 18, 1999).
13. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 2, cl. 5 (emphasis added).
14. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 3, cl. 6 (emphasis added).

1999]

BOOK REVIEWS

411

tion not to exercise it to the hilt. 15 Thus, the House need not
prosecute all high crimes and misdemeanors; and the Senate
16
need not try all cases the H ouse presses.
All of this begs the question: how should Congress exercise
the discretion that it enjoys in this context? I would suggest a
few considerations that Congress should always keep in mind.
First is the setting in which the alleged misconduct took place.
Not all perjuries are alike. For example, suppose President
Clinton were asked in the Paula Jones case deposition if he has
always loved his wife during their marriage. (This question, argue Jones' lawyers, would go to the question of motive to seek
extramarital sex.) And suppose further that, regardless of any
objections he may have had available to him, he answered the
question, and answered it with a "yes." He then walked out of
the room, and confided to his new paramour that he had answered that way only to spare Mrs. Clinton's feelings-that he
hadn't loved her for some time, but that he didn't want to further embarrass her. Would this be perjury? Quite possibly.
Would it thus be a "high crime or misdemeanor?" Maybe not.
Would it be worthy of impeachment? Certainly not. Context is
17
key. And although Presidential supporters oversimplify when
they argue that the whole impeachment charge was about sex
(surely lies under oath and to the American people are matters
of public concern), we ought never to forget the factual context
in which the President's deceitful conduct occurred. 18
The second consideration that ought to inform the House
and Senate is the public interest. Grand juries and prosecutors
(the House), as well as judges and petit juries (the Senate) are all
15. Where Article I commands Congress or either House to do something in particular, the Constitution's words are clear. See, e.g., U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, clause 5
("[t)he House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers"); § 3,
clause 5 ("[t)he Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore"); § 4, clause 2 ("[t)he Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year"); § 5,
clause 3 ("[e)ach House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same.")
16. In a similar vein, in the criminal setting, grand juries and prosecutors enjoy discretion not to indict, and petit juries enjoy discretion not to convict when to do so would
create injustice.
17. You could play the same game with other crimes. If President Ointon assaulted
Trent Lott to force him to vote in favor of legislation pushed by the President, this assault would be much more impeachment-worthy than a punch in the nose thrown by the
President in response to a wisecrack someone made about Chelsea as the first family was
walking down the street. Just as all assaults are not equally serious, so too with lies, even
lies under oath.
18. This, of course, is one of the features that distinguishes the recently concluded
impeachment episode from Watergate and President Nixon's misconduct.
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supposed to discharge their duties consistent with the public interest, and yet the aspect of the whole impeachment that has
beeR most intriguing is the way in which the informed and expressed will of the American people was almost explicitly ignored by Congress. Now I am certainly not suggesting that good
leadership in Congress requires that the House and Senate always heed the latest overnight poll. But when a supermajority of
the People of the United States-who ordained, established and
perpetuate the Constitution itself-are informed (as they surely
have been) of the facts, and then repeatedly express the opinion
that the President's alleged misconduct does not warrant a
change of leadership, it is hard to understand why this doesn't
19
count. What better way to ascertain the public interest than to
listen to the informed and repeated views of the public itself.
There has been one other constitutional change since 1787
that makes the People's desire to retain the President worthy of
more respect, and that is the decline in the independence of the
electoral college. Like the Senate, the Presidency is a much
more populist institution today than it was under the original
Constitution; as a result, displacing a President whom the People
favor today is undoing the People's choice in a very direct way,
and requires taking that choice by the People into account.
I think the situation is somewhat different where the People
are clamoring for removal rather than retention. In that kind of
case, about which the framers did express concern, I think the
will of the People, while still relevant, should count for less, and
there is more room for independent Congressional judgment.
Thus, in the end, I think Congress and the American people
must each be of the view that removal is warranted before Presidential impeachment should go forward; if either thinks removal
is too hasty, the status quo of retention is and ought to be preserved. Why do I view the constitutional role of the People in
19. In this vein, it bears noting that the framers specifically rested impeachment in
Congress (rather than the Supreme Court) to ensure some accountability. And the inclusion of the House in the process-which is the one aspect of the plan that never changed
from the beginning of the Convention-seems intended to make sure that some body
close to the People would be involved. (Indeed, in describing the House's role in the impeachment process in Federalist 65, Alexander Hamilton refers to the House as the "representatives of the people, (the] accusers." Federalist 65 (Hamilton) in Ointon Rossiter,
ed., The Federalist Papers, 396, 398 (Mentor, 1961).) And after the Seventeenth
Amendment, which brought the Senate closer to the People by providing for direct election of Senators, even the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment should take serious
account of the People's wishes. See generally, Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of
Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 Vand. L.
Rev. 1347,1389-1405 (1996).

1999]

BOOK REVIEWS

413

these asymmetrical terms- counting more in one direction than
the other? Begin with the distinction drawn in the Constitutional text between Congressional duty and power. Congress
has the duty to refuse impeachment for anything less than "high
crimes and misdemeanors," whereas once that threshold is
cleared, the Constitution imposes no obligation to do anything.
Obligatory duties, unlike discretionary powers, one might argue,
require independent assessment. Beyond that, my asymmetrical
intuition in favor of independent interpretation and Presidential
retention flows from the essentially conservative nature of the
impeachment provisions in the Constitution generally.
Consider first the involvement of BOTH houses of Congress. That structure means that an overwhelming majority of
members of Congress (435 house members and 66 Senators, or
501 total) could favor impeachment and removal, but the will of
a mere 34 Senators would carry the day. That's a conservative
design-in the same way that other federal processes are conservatively designed. Take legislation, where each of the four federal institutions in essence has a one-branch veto. If the House
kills a bill, it's dead. If the Senate kills it, it's dead. If the President vetoes it or declines to enforce it, it is meaningless. And if
courts find it unlawful, it cannot be enforced. Alexander Hamilton explained this bias in favor of the status quo in Federalist #
73 in terms of error costs: "to keep things in the same state in
which they happen to be at any given period [is] much more
likely to do good than harm ... The injury which may possibly
be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones." 20 I
think the same rationale informs the structure of Presidential
impeachment provisions.
Consider too in this regard another federal process, and one
which is often analogized to impeachment-criminal prosecution. In any criminal case, all 23 grand jurors and 11 of 12 petit
jurors could vote to convict, and yet a single petit juror can preserve the status quo. No one doubts that each institution and individual in that process should independently agree on culpability before there is a conviction, even though leniency in
deference to community sentiment is perfectly appropriate.
Indeed, the impeachment process in at least one way seems
to privilege the status quo even more than does the criminal process. Recall the 2/3 supermajority requirement in Senate im20.

Federalist 73 (Hamilton) at 441 (cited in note 19).
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peachment. Ordinarily, in a civil or criminal jury setting, when
fewer than the requisite supermajority agree on a result either
way, we say there has been a hung jury. But in impeachment,
when fewer than 67 Senators vote to convict, we say the impeached person is acquitted-even though 67 did not vote
against conviction. This has been true from the beginning of the
Republic all the way through William Rehnquist's pronouncement that Bill Clinton was acquitted. It takes 67 to convict, but
only 34 to acquit. That's asymmetry.
This constitutional preference for the status quo depends, of
course, on the legitimacy of the status quo to begin with. I think
Presidents who prevail in honest elections have always had a
strong claim to legitimacy under our Constitution-Presidential
elections have always been big things (and here I would draw a
distinction between Clinton and Andrew Johnson, who was
never elected President, and even between Clinton and Richard
Nixon, whose electoral victory was tainted by alleged campaign
improprieties). And that claim to legitimacy has only grown
stronger as the role of the People in directly electing their President has itself grown, in ways mentioned above.
HALF-TRUTH #3: IMPEACHMENT IS AN APPROPRIATE
REMEDY FOR GROSS (NO PUN INTENDED)
PRESIDENTIAL MISCONDUCT
Once again, this argument may be accurate as far as it goes,
but it doesn't go far enough. In particular, it suggests that an
appropriate remedy-impeachment-is the only appropriate
remedy. And that is simply not the case. Ms. Coulter makes
only passing (and derogatory) mention of censure or findings of
fact or other non-removal alternatives, (p. 287) but any account
of the Clinton fiasco that aspires to anything resembling
comprehensiveness must discuss this very important topic.
A few things are constitutionally clear. When a President is
impeached by the House and convicted by two-thirds of the Senate, removal from office is automatic, and disqualification from
future office-holding is within the discretion of the Senate.21 But
21. One law professor has recently taken issue with this conventional wisdom. In
"Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process," Occasional Paper# 39,
University of Chicago Law School, Professor Joseph Isenbergh argues that the standard
of "high crimes and misdemeanors" is not the only standard that governs impeachments,
and that Congress has the power to impeach and convict a President for lesser misdeeds,
in which case it has the power, but not the obligation, to remove him. Although this is
not the place to explain all the reasons I disagree with Professor Isenbergh's position, let
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nothing in the Constitution says that a Congress that starts down
the impeachment path cannot explore other avenues as well.
The power to impeach implies, at the very least, the power to
make known the conditions under which impeachment is more
or less likely. Thus, Congress could always have legitimately decided the President has committed certain reprehensible acts for
which he must be accountable and then informed the President-either formally or informally-that an apology and demonstration of personal monetary sacrifice by him would have restored public faith in the administration such that he would have
remained fit for office and thus unimpeachable. The President
could then have determined for himself whether the conditional
grant of impeachment immunity was acceptable. If so, impeachment proceedings could have ended; if not, they could have continued.
Such a deal, while not judicially enforceable, would not
have been unconstitutional. It would not necessarily have been
a forbidden "Bill of Attainder" as some have suggested. 22 Bills
me just observe here that under his reading of the relevant constitutional text, a President could be impeached, convicted and (if Congress felt like it) removed from office by
a majority of the House and two-thirds of the Senate for vetoing an important piece of
legislation, whereas overriding the veto itself would require MORE in the way of process, that is, a two-thirds majority of both houses. Enough said.
22. A mere Congressional or one-house censure of the President, without a Congressional request or requirement of apology or monetary sacrifice, would to my mind
not be a bill of attainder, even without President assent. The reason for this is simple:
censure alone likely does not "punish" in a legally cognizable way. This is suggested by
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,713-14 (1976), where the Court held there was no protected
interest/cognizable injury for purposes of a procedural Due Process claim when police
distributed to local merchants a flyer identifying plaintiff as a "known active shoplifter"
notwithstanding the effect such circulation had on his reputation. Like procedural Due
Process, Bill of Attainder jurisprudence focuses not on whether government can inflict
injury on an individual, but rather on the process government goes through before inflicting the injury. For that reason, Paul is relevant, though not controlling, precedent for
Congressional censure of President Ointon. Such a permissible censure could take the
form of separate resolutions by the House and Senate, or a concurrent resolution not
subject to Presidential presentment.
Nor is Presidential censure problematic because the Constitution makes no explicit
mention of any such congressional power. The Senate's sole power to try all impeachments (and/or the House's sole power to initiate impeachments) would provide the requisite enumerated authority. Judges often make findings of fact even when they ultimately conclude that the law affords the plaintiff no relief. And just as judges or juries
(which may be polled) can explain their results, so too the Senate (or the House, for that
matter, acting as a grand jury) can explain what it did and did not conclude. In short,
there is simply no requirement that courts-or the Senate as a court-rule on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence without making or before making any findings of fact
and sentiment.
. Two final points: (1) Although there may be sound prudential reasons for waiting
until after the Senate impeachment Court is dismissed before introducing any motion of
censure (to avoid confusion about the actual impeachment vote and to avoid any ques-
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of Attainder are person-specific laws enacted by a legislature to
punish individuals. A conditional grant of impeachment immunity would be person-specific, but because of the context and the
President's assent it would be lenient rather than punitive. Consider the following analogy: Legislation that provided "Vik
Amar shall be deported for violating immigration laws" would
be a Bill of Attainder. But legislation that provided "Vik Amar,
who has violated immigration laws, shall not be subject to deportation" would not be an attainder, because it would be merciful
rather than punitive. So too, legislation that provided "Vik
Amar, who has violated immigration laws, shall not be subject to
deportation provided he promises not to violate immigration
laws in the future" would not be a prohibited Bill of Attainder.
So long as Congress believes that a President may-if he does
not accept the conditional amnesty-be subject to Congressional
prosecution and removal, a Congressional offer would be an exercise of mercy, rather than punishment, when compared to the
harsher alternative of possible conviction and removal. 23
To put my point another way, the Constitution does not deprive Congress of powers that prosecutors traditionally enjoyto use prosecutorial discretion to plea bargain in those situations
where a defendant can still take actions that may make him unworthy of the greater sanction. 24 Indeed, reading the Constitution, as many have done, so as to force Congress into an ali-ornothing situation may lead to situations in which Congress, the
President and the People all agree something other than removal
is in the public interest and yet Congress will have to remove to
avoid doing nothing at all. Such unnecessary and unwise removals of Presidents could in the long run undermine the power of

tions about res judicata implications for later civil or criminal litigation), such concerns
do not rise to the level of constitutional constraints; and (2) Whether the findings are
styled as a censure or findings of fact would seem to be no constitutional moment. How
specifically the Senate (or the House, for that matter) wants to be in its factual determinations and condemnations are matters of politics, not constitutional law.
23. If Congress did not believe the President had committed impeachable deeds in
the first place, or has already acquitted him in an impeachment trial, of course the situation is different. In that case, any "deal" requiring the President to do anything would be
problematic, because Congress would not have authority to take any coercive action
against the President if he did not comply. Of course, as noted above, see note 22, the
Congress-or each house-could still issue findings of fact and/or censure.
24. Nor does the fact that the Constitution does not mention any other offense besides impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors destroy the plea bargain analogy.
Imagine a child charged with the lowest crime in the statute books-candy shoplifting. A
prosecutor (or judge) could dismiss the charge before trial on the condition that the child
steer clear of the complainant store, even though no "lesser" offense is pleaded to.
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the Presidency and the balance of powers people who adopt the
ali-or-nothing reading of the Constitution purport to care about.
Congress could-if it wanted-even go beyond impeachment immunity, and insulate the President from federal (but not
state) criminal liability after he leaves office. 25 Just because
Presidents enjoy the power to pardon federal criminals does not
mean that Congress lacks a similar power, provided exercise of
26
the power furthers legitimate Congressional objectives.
Perhaps many of Ms. Coulter's constitutional half-truths are
explained by something she says over and over-that impeachment is, and "was supposed to be" partisan.17 To the extent that
Ms. Coulter means that the process ideally should be partisan
(and not just that people might suppose that the process would
devolve into partisanship), I guess I disagree. To be sure, the
process is and was intended to be "political" -in that the ultimate question of impeachment worthiness is fitness to lead the
country and the free world politically. But politics and partisanship are not quite the same thing in this context. (p. 12) I
thought that the two-thirds requirement for conviction in the
Senate, and the Andrew Johnson and Richard Nixon impeachment episodes earlier in American history made clear that impeachment of a sitting President in which few of the people who
are of the President's party were in favor of ousting him runs
afoul of our deepest constitutional and democratic ideals. But
sometimes lessons must be relearned in succeeding generations.28
Understanding and teaching these is one of the primary missions
of the legal academy. And if we can get some help from the political punditry, we'll gladly take it.
25. Although the matter is not entirely free from difficulty, such immunity would
not, I believe, be a forbidden "emolument" under Article II, because it would be prospective and speculative (given that criminal liability is not yet affixed).
26. One obvious Congressional objective jumps to mind-making it easier for the
President to execute the laws during the balance of his tenure, without being preoccupied
with jail-time after leaving. Remember, the necessary and proper clause of Article I
gives Congress the power to make laws to effectuate not just its powers, but the President's and the federal courts' powers as well.
27. Seep. 19. ("It's supposed to be partisan.")(emphasis in original). But seep. 12
("When Hamilton described impeachable offenses as 'political,' he did not mean partisan.")
28. In addition to reinforcing the lesson, which should have been internalized after
Andrew Johnson, that impeachment of a President has to be bipartisan to be worthwhile,
the Ointon affair may teach a second, related, lesson: Presidential impeachment is illegitimate and irresponsible when few of the citizens who voted in favor of the President
and gave him the Presidency conclude, after learning the facts, that they want to change
leadership.

